The recent easing of tensions between Washington and Brasília had little to do with diplomatic skill from Brazil’s government and far more to do with Donald Trump’s shifting personal calculus, according to former U.S. diplomat John Feeley.
In an interview with BBC News Brasil, the ex-ambassador argued that Trump effectively abandoned Jair Bolsonaro once the former Brazilian president was convicted and imprisoned, branding him a political liability rather than an ally.
Feeley, who served as U.S. ambassador to Panama and later became one of the State Department’s leading specialists on Latin America, said Trump’s disengagement from Bolsonaro followed a familiar pattern.
“As soon as Bolsonaro lost — that is, as soon as he was convicted and jailed — Donald Trump saw him as a loser,” Feeley said. “And if there’s one thing Trump does not tolerate, it’s losers.”
According to the former diplomat, Trump’s retreat from confrontational measures against Brazil, including the suspension of tariffs and the removal of Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes from a U.S. sanctions list, reflected Trump’s erratic behavior rather than any strategic concession to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
“Frankly, Lula was lucky,” Feeley said, adding that Trump is unpredictable, deeply personalistic, and nearly impossible to negotiate with in a conventional diplomatic sense.
From ally to disposable asset
Feeley dismissed the idea that Trump maintained any deep interest in Bolsonaro or Brazil itself. “I don’t think Donald Trump knows much about Bolsonaro,” he said. “I can almost guarantee he doesn’t wake up every day thinking about Brazil.” In his view, the brief alignment between the two leaders was rooted less in genuine ideological affinity and more in Trump’s cynical use of conservative symbolism to energize segments of his domestic political base.
That alignment collapsed once Bolsonaro ceased to be politically useful. Feeley compared Trump’s approach to lessons drawn from Roy Cohn, the late lawyer who shaped Trump’s worldview: never apologize, never admit mistakes, and always retaliate harder when challenged. “When Bolsonaro stopped being a reference in Brazilian politics and the rule of law prevailed, Trump simply discarded him,” Feeley said.
The former ambassador also attributed Washington’s earlier punitive actions against Brazil — including steep tariffs on agricultural products and sanctions under the Magnitsky Act — to lobbying efforts by Eduardo Bolsonaro in Washington rather than to any coherent foreign policy strategy. Trump, Feeley argued, is easily influenced by well-connected lobbyists and intermediaries who gain access to decision-makers close to him.
Beyond Brazil, Feeley addressed the broader escalation between the United States and Venezuela, arguing that Washington’s recent enforcement of tanker seizures against sanctioned vessels is far more effective than earlier U.S. strikes on small boats accused of drug trafficking.
While acknowledging that sanctions and blockades often produce secondary humanitarian effects, he rejected the notion that they are the root cause of Venezuela’s crisis. In his assessment, the mass exodus of Venezuelans is primarily the result of Nicolás Maduro’s economic model, not foreign pressure.
Feeley was equally skeptical of the Trump administration’s overall strategy toward Caracas. He questioned whether Washington has a clearly defined end goal, noting that regime change has never been openly declared despite mounting military pressure.
“A strategy has to start with an end state,” he said. “I don’t see one here.”
Looking ahead, Feeley argued that a full-scale U.S. invasion of Venezuela is unlikely, largely because American public opinion does not support sacrificing lives for regime change in the country. At most, he speculated, Trump might authorize limited missile strikes before stepping back.
An escalation into a broader regional conflict, he warned, would revive long-standing anti-American sentiment across Latin America and undermine decades of efforts to reposition the United States as a democratic partner rather than a coercive power.
As for Brazil’s role, Feeley said the country’s greatest contribution would not be mediation between Washington and Caracas but the example of its own democratic resilience. In his view, Brazil’s handling of institutional stress after January 8 offers a model of constitutional restraint that could resonate more with the American public than with Trump himself.